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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we prove that the noncooperative solution with mutually 
consistent conjectures is the same as the contract curve of the 
cooperative solution in a two-person game.  A numerical example is 
also presented. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic conflict, or competitive behaviour between a finite and 
possibly small number of agents, is best modelled as a game.  There 
are obvious applications in oligopoly theory (Friedman, 1977, 1983), 
international policy coordination (Oudiz and Sachs, 1985), wage 
bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988), environmental issues 
(Pethig, 1992), development economics (Li and Ma, 1996) as well as 
in many other areas. 
 
In two-person games,  two distinct behaviour patterns are possible: 
cooperative vs. non-cooperative.  In a non-cooperative game (e.g. 
Nash or conjectural variations, see Basar and Olsder, 1982), each 
player will try to minimise his own cost function, conditional on the 
opponent's decision rule.  But it is known that such non-cooperative 
decisions are socially inefficient (Da Cuhna and Polak, 1967).  In 
contrast, a cooperative game is to minimise a joint cost function by 
the two players working together and will generate Pareto optimal 
outcomes. 
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In this paper, we show that, under certain conditions,  
non-cooperative behaviour can turn out to be Pareto efficient as well, 
i.e. the players in a non-cooperative game can behave as if they were 
playing a cooperative game, even though there is no pre-commitment 
for them to do so.  That implies a built-in self-enforcement 
mechanism which would lead them to behave cooperatively out of 
self-interest.  To show this, we  work with one particular form of 
non-cooperative game: the conjectural variations equilibrium.  Our 
result therefore extends earlier work by De Bruyne (1979), which 
showed that the Nash noncooperative equilibrium is Pareto optimal 
only when the targets and preferences are identical  for all players. 
 
2. Conjectural Variations Solutions 
Non-cooperation implies that each player in the game maximises his 
self-interest, subject to his perception of the constraints on his 
decision variables, conditional on rational expectations about the 
decisions taken by others.  For simplicity, we shall restrict attention 
to two-player static games here.  Each decision maker has one 
 
 3 
instrument, xi to reach one target yi (i=1,2).  The private interests of 
each player can then be represented by the cost functions:  
wi = wi ( yi , xi ) , i = 1, 2. 
The players face a static reduced-form economic system: 
yi = fi ( x1 , x2 ) , i = 1, 2. 
Given a suitable starting point, conjectural variations can now be used 
to deduce appropriate reaction terms within the optimisation process.  
Like in chess, each player recognises that his decisions affect the 
targets and hence the policy choice of his opponent, and that 
variations in the latter then influence his targets again and hence what 
he (the first player) should decide to do.  Instead of optimising 
conditional on fixed reactions by the opponent ('given he does that, 
what should I do?'), each player must now anticipate his opponent's 
reactions ('if I do this, how will he react and how should I best 
accommodate that?, etc.').  The conjectural variations employed by 
each player here are captured by ∂x1/∂x2 and ∂x2/∂x1 (while the Nash 
equilibrium, of course, sets ∂x1/∂x2=∂x2/∂x1=0 ex ante).  By 
optimising the decisions associated with each variation in the 
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conjectured responses to the currently envisaged choices, and then 
constraining those variations so that the new pair of decisions 
represent an improvement over the old pair, we reach the closed-loop 
conjectural variations equilibrium.  That equilibrium holds only 
when both players perceive that no further gains can be made by 
varying their reactions to the decisions currently expected from their 
opponent, because to do so would trigger counter-reactions (in the 
opponent's interest) which would more than offset the gains of 
unilateral action. 
 
There has been extensive discussion of the interpretation of 
conjectural variations model (see, for example, Bresnahan, 1981; 
Kamien and Schwartz, 1983).  It has been argued by Friedman 
(1983), among others, that it arises in a static one-shot game, cannot 
be taken as a literal expectations of future reactions.  Many game 
theorists prefer to utilise repeated game models,  which, however, 
have their own weaknesses.   A paper by Kalai and Stanford (1985) 
explicitly analyzes conjectural variations in a repeated game 
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framework, showing that various conjectural variations can be 
maintained as credible equilibria.   While Brander and Spencer 
(1985) and Dixit (1988) hold the view that the conjectural variations 
are simply a useful and intuitive summary measure of market conduct. 
 Recent applications of conjectural variations model in 
microeconomics can be found in the papers by Brander and Zhang 
(1989, 1993) who assessed the post-deregulation competitiveness of 
the US airline industry.  Applications of conjectural variations model 
in the international macroeconomics can be found in Sterdyniak and 
Villa (1993) who investigated the international policy coordination 
issues. 
 
However, the conjectural variations equilibrium is indeterminate as 
the conjectures are formed outside the model.  Independent efforts 
have been made to narrow the possible market equilibria by imposing 
additional constraints that the conjectural variations be 'consistent' 
(Friedman, 1977; Laitner, 1980; Bresnahan, 1981; Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1983).   One way to solve this multiply solution problem 
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is by imposing self consistent conjectures for the players (see, for 
example, Bresnahan, 1981):  the conjecture in the reaction function 
is set to the slope of the reaction function.   Under certain conditions, 
the self consistent conjectures equilibrium is unique.  In this paper, 
we try to examine the conjectural variations solution by imposing an 
alternative assumption:  the conjectures in the reaction function of 
each player are mutually consistent.  We find that this assumption 
will give us a general condition under which the conjectural variations 
solution becomes a cooperative solution. 
 
3. The Equivalence of Noncooperative Solution with 
Mutually Consistent Conjectures and Cooperative 
Solution 
The necessary conditions for optimal decisions with conjectural 
variations are 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.        (1) 
for i=1 and 2 (and i≠j), where Ei(∂xj/∂xi) is the player i's expectation 
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on the player j's response.   From this we derive : 
 
Theorem  Suppose player i (i=1,2) tries to minimise his objective 
function wi by choosing instrument xi subject to a constraint fi: 
Then, the conjectural variations general solution is the same as the 
contract curve, if the two players' expectations are mutually consistent, 
i.e.  
 Ei(∂xj/∂xi) =  ∂xj/∂xi (2)  
where Ei(.) is player i's expectation (i=1,2 and i≠j).  This states that 
the reaction player j chooses is consistent with what player i expect 
him to choose. 
Proof 
For any given value of objective function k, the indifference curve for 
player i is: 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
 
 8 
Therefore, the derivative of the indifference curve for player 1 is: 
Similarly,  the derivative of the indifference curve for player 2 is 
The contract curve is the locus at which the derivatives of the two 
indifference curves are the same, i.e. the locus of the tangent points of 
the two players' indifference curves: 
 
 
For the conjectural variations game in (1), player 1's decisions must 
satisfy: 
where E1(∂x2/∂x1)≠0, and player 2's decisions 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
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where E2(∂x1/∂x2)≠0. But in equilibrium we are able to cancel the 
terms of E2(∂x1/∂x2) and E1(∂x2/∂x1) under mutually consistent 
expectations condition, since: 
   Hence,  in equilibrium we have: 
 
which is the same as the contract curve (6). That implies that there is 
an one-to-one correspondence between the contract curve and the 
mutually consistent conjectures solution. 
[Q.E.D.] 
 
To illustrate the theorem, we apply it to solve a particular problem 
which is given as follows: 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
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The conjectural variations solution is: 
∂w1/∂x1 = 0 , i.e. y1 [ 1 + E1(∂x2/∂x1) ] + x1 = 0 , 
and 
∂w2/∂x2 = 0 , i.e. y2 [ 1 + E2(∂x1/∂x2) ] + x2 = 0 , 
implying that the noncooperative solution with mutually consistent 
conjectures must satisfy: 
 x12+x2 + 3x1x2-x1-x2=0 (13) 
 
Meanwhile the indifference curves of the two players are, 
respectively: 
(x1+x2-1)2+x12=k1 and (x1+x2-1)2+x2=k2 (for any given k1, 
k2) 
The derivatives of the indifference curves are: 
and the contract curve of the cooperative solution is 
 x12+x2 + 3x1x2-x1-x2=0 (15) 
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
Install Equation Editor and double-
click here to view equation.  
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which is exactly the same as the noncooperative solution with 
mutually consistent conjectures (13) (see Figure 1). 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proved that the noncooperative solution with the 
mutually consistent conjectures is the same as the contract curve of 
the cooperative solution in the two-person game.  This implies that 
the players in a non-cooperative game can sometimes behave like in a 
cooperative game, for their own self-interest, although there is no 
binding commitment for them to do so.  The result clearly is 
important for the policymakers when they design the coordinated 
policy packages,  for the study of the market behaviour and in other 
areas. 
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